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Antitrust law is in a state of turmoil. The administration
has appointed officials to the Justice Department who have
viewpoints which differ radically from those held by prior
prosecutors, as well as those developed in decided cases. Pro-
fessor Baxter, now Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust,
has expressed a disinclination to press anti-merger policy. In
sharp contrast, some members of Congress press to expand
the role of antitrust, both by challenging its present enforce-
ment and by proposing legislation absolutely to limit the size
of the country's largest corporations.
A related problem is also enmeshed in present uncer-
tainty. The pricing policies of firms in oligopolistic industries
have recently been brought under attack by a new "shared
monopoly" theory. Prior law has, for technical reasons, been
unavailing. Whether the present administration intends to
pursue the theory further is unclear.
These two problems of concentration and imitative pric-
ing patterns, present policy choices both for the United States
and for Japan. This article undertakes a comparative exami-
nation of proposed solutions in the United States and a solu-
tion enacted in Japan.
Antitrust law is designed to promote a free enterprise
economy. Consequently it generally satisfies its purpose when
restrictions on competition are eliminated. Once such re-
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straints are eliminated, free market economics are thought to
govern. So long as one is satisfied with the general level of
economic concentration in one's country, antitrust need go no
further.
This suggested pristine model has been universally dis-
turbed by national planning policy intruding on "free enter-
prise" rather than by attempts to press antitrust law to its
limits.' However, in the United States since the Clayton Act
Amendment of 1950,2 and in Japan since the amendment to
the Antitrust Law of 1977,8 antitrust law has appeared to
grapple with the problem of corporate "bigness." Size is of
concern even though it does not present a threat to a competi-
tive economy in any given market.
II. SIZE AND OLIGOPOLY POWER
In its interpretation of antitrust law, the United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly said that size alone is not an
offense." The assertion is logically necessary to the structure
of the antitrust laws when the laws are perceived simultane-
ously to promote aggressive competition and to anticipate the
maximum benefit of efficiencies of scale." Without knowing
the optimal size of a company, it is difficult to justify a posi-
tion that size alone is offensive from an economic perspective.
1. To the author's knowledge, no one has attempted empirically to verify this
rather obvious proposition. Much has been written, on the other hand, regarding the
relative effectiveness of antitrust and direct regulation. See, e.g., W. SHEPARD, THE
TREATMENT OF MARKET POWER-ANTITRUST, REGULATION, AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISE
(1975).
2. Celler-Kefauver Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (current version
at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976)).
3. Act Relating to the Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of
Preserving Fair Trade, Act No. 54 of Apr. 14, 1947, (Japan), as amended on June 3,
1977.
4. Justice McKenna appears to be the first to have used the phrase in his ma-
jority opinion in United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920).
It has been repeated many times, but by 1948, and in United States v. Griffith, 334
U.S. 100 (1948), the Court added it to the significant follow-up: "But size is of course
an earmark of monopoly power." 334 U.S. 100 at 107 n.10.
5. As explained later, other policy considerations come into play in antitrust
enforcement. Principal among these are the non-economic goals discussed later in the
text accompanying notes. Some have argued that the maximization of consumer wel-
fare should be the sole value guiding antitrust decisions. See, e.g., R. BORK, THE AN-
TITRUST PARADOX, 50-89 (1978). Whatever attractiveness this view might have, it is
clear that since Learned Hand's landmark opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), considerations other than consumer welfare
have played an important role in the law's development.
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For example, it may be true that the cost of capital in an
industry, or the .intricacies of manufacture, or the transporta-
tion costs of raw materials, all make it more efficient for a
small number of producers to occupy the market than for the
market to be in the hands of a substantially larger number."
From an economic standpoint, oligopoly does not present
a threat to competition unless additional factors are also pre-
sent. It is of course true that oligopoly may be a way station
to obtaining monopoly power. One of the member firms may
decide, through predatory pricing for example, to drive the
other from the market. Anti-monopoly law and restrictive
trade provisions, however, already punish such behavior. A
more intractable problem is presented by conscious parallel
pricing. If firms, through price leadership or by careful unilat-
eral adjustment to each others' prices, choose to establish
higher than "competitive" prices, they presently escape anti-
trust censure so long as they do not collaborate. Section 1 of
the Sherman Act requires duality: contract combination or
conspiracy.
As a general matter, the two aforementioned problems,
one resolvable under present law while the other is more prob-
lematic, are the major risks to competition created by oligopo-
lies. Neither situation necessarily attends oligopoly. Nonethe-
less, merger cases have treated the creation of oligopoly power
as itself anti-competitive without examining whether any spe-
cific anti-competitive acts exist.
A. Shifting Emphasis of United States Law
When the United States enacted the Sherman Act in
18907 and the Clayton Act following it in 1914,8 it appeared
that the acts were principally aimed at prohibiting two kinds
of economic behavior: conduct designed to limit competition
(restraints of trade) and monopolization.9 Examples of the
6. See generally Williamson, Economics as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125
U. PA. L. REv. 699 (1977).
7. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1976)).
8. Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-
27 (1976)).
9. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, provides in part: "Every con-
tract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal."
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former were price fixing and the division of markets among
competitors. 10 The latter was usually exemplified by the ob-
taining of a monopoly by aggressive means." Thus defined,
however, the impact of antitrust law on the economy at large
tends to be fairly slight. As long as monopolies are defined in
a way which requires control of more than three-quarters of
the relevant product market, 2 it is possible in most industries
to avoid monopoly law by simply keeping several competitors
in business.' 8
Firms kept in an industry by sufferance or connivance
may present only the facade of competition. If they were truly
effective competitors, such firms would likely have remained
in business without help. The need for help usually indicates
that the company involved has higher costs than the helping
firm. Because of those costs they are unable to compete effec-
tively. The assistance they are furnished could moderate any
remaining desire to challenge the benefactor firm's pricing
structure out of gratitude if not sub rosa agreement.
Anticompetitive conduct is likewise usually easy to avoid
and, consequently, its prohibition is not very disruptive. How-
Section 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2, provides in part: "Every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with for-
eign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony. ... "
10. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States
v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and afl'd. 175 U.S. 211 (1899). The list of
prohibited conduct, of course, is much longer. And given the continued vitality of
Chief Justice Hughes' description of the Sherman Act as having "a generality and
adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions," it
will in all probability continue to grow. (Quotations from Appalachian Coals, Inc. v.
United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933)).
11. E.g., Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
12. Just when a firm possesses a predominant share of a relevant market has
not been mathematically stated by the Supreme Court, but 75% is a reasonable, and
safe, approximation. Surely 80% seems to be beyond the threshold, (see American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 797 (1946)), and less than 50% does not
(United States v. Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 346 (D. Mass. 1953), afl'd per
curiam 347 U.S. 521 (1954)). The Ninth Circuit has accepted 65% in Pacific Coast
Agricultural Export Ass'n v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 526 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976). The magic number will in fact vary "with the set-
ting in which that factor is placed." United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S.
495, 528, reh'g denied, 334 U.S. 862 (1948).
13. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945),
Learned Hand notes, and discounts, Alcoa's argument that it had "positively assisted
competitors" to avoid attaining monopoly power. At least in this instance, the "de-
fense" failed. Id. at 431.
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ever, there are several noteworthy exceptions. If it is an in-
defensible violation of antitrust law to try to prevent price
gouging by the sellers of one's own product,1 4 then such con-
duct may be avoided only with difficulty because gouging will
result in reduced product sales.' 5 The idea that boycotts are
violative as restraints of trade also raises a number of
problems not easily resolved."6 In the main it is not necessary
to restructure business to avoid collaborating on price setting.
One does not have to abandon a competitive posture to avoid
prohibited predatory conduct toward competitors. Most sig-
nificantly, in taking this approach, large size, short of monop-
oly, does not by itself suffice to establish misconduct. Size is a
factor, however, in merger cases.
Since the post-1950 antimerger movement, avoiding anti-
trust pitfalls has become much harder for large corporations.17
The 1950 antimerger law revision, with its congressional man-
date to decrease economic concentration, was interpreted by
the United States Supreme Court to provide the Department
of Justice a great deal of latitude in dealing with growth and
concentration.18 If Justice Stewart proved an uncertain
prophet in saying the government always wins merger cases,1'
he at least described accurately the success record of the gov-
ernment for a large portion of the Post World War II era. 0
While merger policy purports merely to forbid incipient
14. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, reh'g denied, 390 U.S. 1018
(1968).
15. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Albrecht, correctly pointed out the economic
distinction between minimum and maximum price maintenance. 390 U.S. at 156. His
argument that the latter should only be subjected to rule of reason scrutiny, however,
was in vain. The clear rule of law is that a combination or conspiracy to fix maximum
prices is a per se violation of § 1. Id. at 153; Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram
& Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
16. E.g., A Department of Justice suit against Bechtel Corporation raised the
question of political motivation in boycotts. See United States v. Bechtel Corp. 1979-
1 Trade Cas. 1 62, 429 (N.D. Cal., Jan. 5, 1979), noted in Longstreet, United States v.
Bechtel Corporation: Antitrust and the Arab Blacklist, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
299 (1978).
17. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), was the first case to
reach the United States Supreme Court after the 1950 amendments. The quintessen-
tial statement of the purposes of the amendments appear in Chief Justice Warren's
opinion for the Court. Id. at 311-23.
18. Id.
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monopolization or restraint of trade, it is the most available
legal sanction for concentration. Concentration may certainly
lead to monopolization and, of course, may not. So long as
courts uphold the government's theories for divining the fu-
ture effect of present organization, a government bent on do-
ing so can use antimerger policy to achieve greater economic
pluralism. Cases from the post World War II period through
the 1970's are easier to reconcile on the basis of such political
considerations than with regard to economic theory.
Ultimately, a reduction of the number of firm members in
an industry will lead to monopoly. At that point, irrespective
of efficiencies, competition will no longer be available as a di-
rect check on pricing.2 1 The state must then deal with these
monopolies in one of several ways., In some cases, the most
appropriate response is to create a utility and to substitute
public management for the force of competition.2 2 The classic
illustration of this form of management is in the area of elec-
tric, gas, and telephone service. Another way of dealing with
the problem is to insist on creating or recreating a competitor,
or a number of competitors, thus reintroducing competition as
a market force.28 American law has done both24 and has also
applied the remedy to non-monopolies.25
Concerns beyond restoring competition also play an im-
portant part in dealing with concentration. In United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa),2 6 Judge Hand, after dis-
posing of the economic arguments militating against monop-
21. This of course does not imply that the monopolists may not provide the
best available consumer prices. They may do so, even without the compulsion of anti-
trust law, in self interest. That is, the optimal price for a monopolist may be lower
than the price that would be competitively arrived at by less efficient firms. See gen-
erally R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 163-97 (1978).
22. See generally, W. SHEPARD, THE TREATMENT OF MARKET
PowER-ANTITRUST, REGULATION, AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISE (1975).
23. This is the usual decree when a consummated merger is deemed to have
violated § 7 of the Clayton Act. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l Bank and Trust
Co. of Lexington, 193 ATRR A-10 (E.D. Ky 1965) (order required merged banks to set
up an independent competitor). Divestiture has also been a familiar remedy in mo-
nopolization cases. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
24. See, e.g., Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); United States v. El Paso Natural
Gas Co., 376 U.S 651 (1964).
25. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). It is significant that as
a result of this case, the AP was forced to acquire more members, thus strengthening
its dominant position in its industry.
26. 148 F.2d 416 (1945).
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oly, addressed political concerns and found them indepen-
dently sufficient:
We have been speaking only of the economic reasons
which forbid monopoly; but, as we have already implied,
there are others, based upon the belief that great indus-
trial consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless
of their economic results. In the debates in Congress, Sen-
ator Sherman himself in the passage quoted in the margin
showed that among the purposes of Congress in 1890 was
a desire to put an end to great aggregations of capital be-
cause of the helplessness of the individual before them.2
Judge Hand interpreted the law as rejecting concentration
and requiring economic pluralism irrespective of cost.
Alcoa did not directly repudiate the notion that size itself
was no offense, but it did provide a rationale for considering
the absence of small competitors to be objectionable.2 8 The
same rationale was stated by the Court in several other cases.
Justice Douglas was its particular champion. He pressed his
point in United States v. Columbia Steel Co.29 In United
States v. Griffith,5 0 he opined that size provided the opportu-
nity for abuse. 1 In Standard Oil Co. v. United States,3 2 he
was driven to dissent from an antitrust finding against Stan-
dard Oil of California for fear that Standard would resort to
forward vertical integration which would eliminate small ser-
vice stations from their markets."
27. Id. at 428.
28. "Throughout the history of these statutes it has been constantly assumed
that one of their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in
spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in small units which can effectively
compete with each other." Id. at 429 (emphasis added).
29. 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
30. 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
31. Id. at 107 n.10.
32. 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
33. Justice Douglas was willing to accept requirements contracts even though
"the situation is not ideal," because it would at least preserve service stations "as
small business units." He feared the alternative:
The elimination of these requirements contracts sets the stage for Stan-
dard and the other oil companies to build service station empires of
their own. The opinion of the Court does more than set the stage for
that development. It is an advisory opinion as well, stating to the oil
companies how they can with impunity build their empires. The formula
suggested by the Court is either the use of the "agency" device, which in
practical effect means control of filling stations by the oil companies (cf.
FTC v. Curtis Co., 260 U.S. 568 (1923)), or the outright acquisition of
1982]
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Similarly, Justice Frankfurter, in Standard Oil, was will-
ing to accept a function of size as a sufficient guarantor of
anticompetitive effect of exclusive dealing arrangements,
which the Court held otherwise possibly unobjectionable, in
accepting the lower court's quantitative substantiality stan-
dard. He suggested that the finding of large dollar volume in
sales might be as sophisticated a standard as courts could
manage.34
The antimerger cases are murkier in their goals. The
Clayton Act was designed to reach Sherman Act violations in
their incipiency." Consequently, it seems logical that courts
should declare illegal, under the antimerger provisions, acts
which clearly were not yet full blown restraints of trade, and
certainly not yet monopolies. Actually, though, it was not un-
til the 1950 technical amendments3 6 to the Clayton Act that
the Court took a broad view of the use of antimerger provi-
sions to halt concentration.3 7
The merger theory purports to deal with corporate acqui-
sition where the effect of the acquisition is likely to create a
monopoly or otherwise to restrain trade. In theory, merger
policy is consistent with restraint of trade policy. In practice
it is not. The United States Supreme Court has upheld
merger prosecutions on the grounds that the Clayton Act was
designed to reach acts in their incipiency which, when full
blown, violate the Sherman Act. Of course, prediction is diffi-
cult in general and specifically difficult in economics. None-
them by subsidiary corporations or otherwise. See United States v. Co-
lumbia Steel Co., supra. Under the approved judicial doctrine either of
those devices means increasing the monopoly of the oil companies over
the retail field.
Id. at 320.
34. 337 U.S. at 310.
35. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. at 317-18.
36. As passed in 1914, the Clayton Act forbade only the acquisition of stock in
another company, where the effect might be to substantially lessen competition or
tend to create monopoly. Act of October 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976)). Given the variety of ways in which corporations are able to
reorganize into a single unit, it was not at all difficult for companies to evade the
law's prohibition. See, e.g., United States v. Celanese Corp. of America, 91 F. Supp.
14 (S.D. N.Y. 1950) (asset acquisition not covered by § 7). The Celler-Kefauver Act of
December 29, 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125, (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976)) broad-
ened the scope of § 7 to prohibit direct and indirect acquisitions of the "whole or any
part of the stock or other share capital" or "any part of the assets of another corpora-
tion" when the requisite anticompetitive effects were present. Id.
37. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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theless, if one seeks, for example, to find the ability to monop-
olize in a five percent concentration of the market,8" one must
have great confidence in the ability to forecast since having
one-twentieth of an extant market rarely, by itself, suggests
imminent monopoly power. Nor are twenty firms inherently
likely to engage in joint activity such as price fixing which
would be anticompetitive."9 More significantly, perhaps, if
they did engage in joint activity or successfully monopolized,
they would then be vulnerable for their accomplished acts.4 0
The number of instances in which firms with five per cent
market control have emerged monopolists or engaged in price
fixing behavior is necessarily quite small.
Prediction permits finding future problems that are be-
lied by the present actions. Justice Stewart pointed out in
United States v. Von's Grocery Co.,4 1 for example, that the
available evidence demonstrated the relevant grocery merger
was procompetitive when it occurred; nonetheless, the Court
found the merger to be anticompetitive because of its future
consequences.
The routine practice of the Supreme Court was to con-
firm the Department of Justice's selection of defendants. As a
result, even the fairly broad potential of the incipiency stan-
dard was enhanced by market definitions that appear difficult
to explain, except as being conclusion-oriented. One may puz-
zle, for example, how the Court found aluminum conductor to
be the relevant market in Rome Cable by blithely amalgamat-
38. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, Chief Justice Warren was
willing to do so. He cited government figures which purported to show that the
Brown-Kinney Merger would give the combined companies in excess of 5% of the
market in "one of the relevant lines of commerce" in 118 cities. The Chief Justice
continued:
In an industry as fragmented as shoe retailing, the control of substantial
shares of the trade in a city may have important effects on competition.
If a merger achieving 5% control were now approved, we might be re-
quired to approve future merger efforts by Brown's competitors seeking
similar market shares.
Id. at 343-44.
39. The economics of cartels is ably summarized in a triology of articles appear-
ing in CALvANI & SIEGFRIED, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST LAW, 120-61 (1979).
The articles are: Asch & Seneca, Is Collusion Profitable?, 58 Rzv. EcoN. & STAT. 1
(1976); Hay & Kelley, An Empirical Study of Price Fixing Conspiracies, 17 J. L. &
ECON. 13 (1974); and Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. oF POL. ECON. 44 (1967).
40. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
41. See 384 U.S. 270, 301.
1982]
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ing extant markets.2 In this regard, it is difficult not to recall
Justice Stewart's comment that the only consistency is that
the government always wins.4 s
Justice Stewart disproved his own prediction, however, in
United States v. General Dynamics Corp."' in which the
Court reviewed the acquisition of some coal mines by the de-
fendants. 45 Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, asserted
that the coal supply acquired was presumed to be finite and
nearing the limits of its effect in the distant future (and there
certainly was none in the present). The dissenters strongly ob-
jected to the Court's refusal to follow the time-honored
method of first determining product market and percentage
control."' Apparently they did not find it strange to urge that
the methodology for determining anticompetitive effect was to
be preferred over a finding of effect.
Lest one conclude that the dissent in General Dynamics
was acting in a peculiar manner, one should note that the an-
timerger law had become a device for controlling concentra-
tion irrespective of its effect on competition. In that respect,
the dissenters were acting consistently, given General Dynam-
ics' size.'7 From the standpoint of reaching the economic goals
42. United States v. Alcoa, 377 U.S. 271 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Rome
Cable]. Professor Sullivan describes the Court as acting on "the exasperatingly irra-
tional proposition that any combination of submarkets could also constitute a rele-
vant product market." L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK O THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 608 (1977).
43. See 384 U.S. 270, 301.
44. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
45. The Material Service Corp., a producer and supplier of building materials,
concrete, limestone and coal, had acquired a controlling interest in United Electrical
Coal Companies when it was acquired by General Dynamics. The government
claimed that the merger would substantially lessen competition in the production and
sale of coal in either the State of Illinois only, or in an alternate geographic market
consisting of Illinois, Indiana, and parts of six other states. The district court held
against the government on the grounds, inter alia, that United Electric's coal reserves
were too low to make them an effective competitor even if they remained a separate
entity. The United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, affirmed. Id.
46. The district court rejected the government's proposed product market (coal
alone) and instead defined that market to be "energy," including gas, oil, uranium
and other fuels. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 341 F. Supp. 534, 556
(N.D. Ill. 1972). Dissenting, Justice Douglas took issue with the lower court's reading
of United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964), which was relied on to
support the broad definition. Douglas read Continental Can as requiring the court to
consider the coal submarket as the product market even though a broader "energy"
market might in fact exist. 415 U.S. at 513-17.
47. There is scarce mention of General Dynamics, size in the Court's opinion,
but it is described as "a large diversified corporation." 415 U.S. at 489.
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of the statute, however, their position is difficult to justify.
In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,"s the existence of a
trend toward concentration in shoe retailing was viewed by
the Court as a significant reason to prohibit the Brown-Kin-
ney merger. Further, relatively small incremental shares of the
market have been found sufficient to prevent mergers of large
companies with other firms in their fields." Companies have
also been denied entry into new markets through merger when
it was found that alone they might be a potential
competitor.50
In all of these cases the Court's rationale has been that
the arrangement, when full blown, would constitute a monop-
oly of the industry in question. Courts have denied that an-
timerger legislation is aimed at minimizing concentration in-
dependently of its effect on competition in a given market.51
It is, in other words, competition, not competitors (to use that
classic description of the dichotomy) that is protected.5 2
Nonetheless, the forceful language only masks the true ambiv-
alence of courts to reveal whether it is the competition or the
competitors that are the true object of their action. 8
The antimerger provisions thus provide an aspect of es-
tablished American antitrust law in which size appears to lead
to harsher treatment, if not necessarily a finding of illegality.
Even where size is tolerated in non-merger cases, courts often
48. 384 U.S. 270, 301.
49. In Alcoa (Rome Cable), 377 U.S. at 280-81, the Court was willing to prohibit
the merger between Alcoa and Rome Cable even though there would be only a 1.3%
addition to Alcoa's share of the relevant market.
50. E.g., FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
51. "There is certainly no requirement that the anticompetitive power manifest
itself in anticompetitive action before § 7 can be called into play. If the enforcement
of § 7 turned on the existence of actual anticompetitive practices, the congressional
policy of thwarting such practices in their incipiency would be frustrated." Id. at 577.
See also United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
52. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. at 320, 344.
53. It is competition, not competitors, which the Act protects. But we
cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through
the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress ap-
preciated the occasional higher costs and prices that might result from
the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these
competing considerations in favor of decentralization.
Id. at 344. Four years later, Justice Stewart's dissent in United States v. Von's Gro-
cery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 282 (1966), accused the Court of turning its back on this basic
principle. Justice Stewart, however, apparently ignored all but the first sentence of
the above quotation.
19821
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impose obligations, in the asserted interest of competition,
upon those who possess market power which it would not gen-
erally apply to others. 4 It seems equally plausible that the
decrees are directed at the protection of competitors since
courts rarely inquire as to the economic vigor and, hence,
competitive potential of those protected. More clearly, the
boycott cases express a concern for the abuse of the power of
size that does not have any necessary relationship to an effect
on competition. 5
A similar concern is expressed in the tying cases which
prohibit the transfer of market power from the market in
which a firm is dominant to a market in which it is subject to
competitive forces." Exclusive dealing provisions tend to
make the same distinction: legality turns on the extent to
which the buyer, rather than the seller, is being served by con-
tinuous supply.5
7
Finally, and most importantly, despite private treble
damage action provisions,56 the principal thrust of antitrust
law has come from government action. The government has
usually selected large firms for prosecution. In a manner al-
most like an administrative agency, the Justice Department
has brought pressure on the largest firms and left small firms
alone.
In all of these respects, therefore, concern over concentra-
tion has been given silent recognition by the courts. Nonethe-
less, many feel that these measures have inadequately con-
trolled concentration. There is, consequently, a substantial
ongoing debate concerning the appropriate response to con-
centration. The battle lines are easily discerned; one can iden-
tify the proponents and opponents of concentration measures
with little effort. The weaponry, on the other hand, is not so
54. One early example is the decree in Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1 (1946). The "deep pocket" doctrine is another. See FTC v. Proctor & Gamble
Co., 368 U.S. 568, 578-81.
55. Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Radiant Burners, Inc., v.
Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
56. See United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., (Fortner II), 429
U.S. 610 (1977); Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Int'l Sale
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Int'l Business Mach. Corp. v. United
States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
57. See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
58. Clayton Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
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clear. Both sides are heavily armed with aggregate concentra-
tion statistics and legions of expert economists ready to bless
or damn the conglomerate. Yet the very ease with which one
can summon a prominent economist to expound a favorable
opinion on the subject, or to produce the necessary favorable
statistics, suggests the limits of such evidence. As stated by a
prominent attorney in this field: "There are feelings about
larger mergers, there are emotions about large mergers. There
is a suspicion about size and its relationship to the power and
politics of society. But there is an almost total lack of respon-
sible research in the area.""
The government believes that concentration is increasing.
According to the recent testimony of the former Chairman of
the Federal Trade Commission before the Senate Subcommit-
tee on Antitrust and Monopoly:
The 200 largest manufacturing firms have increased their
share of U.S. industry from 45 percent at the end of
World War II to 60 percent today. In 1976, according to
our data, 451 major firms controlled 70 percent of all
manufacturing assets and earned 72 percent of all profits
in the United States. This contrasts with 1960, when com-
parable firms controlled only about half the Nation's
manufacturing assets and 59 percent of profits."
To then FTC Chairman Pertschuk and other supporters of
anticoncentration legislation, figures like these clearly re-
present a threat to the American economic order. To others,
however, this data represents only a harmless trend. The data
does not suggest that anything evil will come of concentration
automatically. In fact, opponents of anticoncentration mea-
sures argue just the opposite-that mergers increase effi-
ciency. The truth is that one does not know. Definitive studies
do not exist and the argument consequently becomes a politi-
cal argument, as opposed to an economic one.'
59. Statement of Ira Millstein, quoted in TimE, May 21, 1979, at 64.
60. Mergers and Industrial Concentration: Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 95th Cong., 2d Seas.
154, 155 (1978) (prepared statement of Michael Pertschuk).
61. Backers of anticoncentration legislation are quick to point this out and
often argue socio-politics exclusively. To support their contentions, they routinely
cite Learned Hand's discussion of the non-economic concerns of antitrust and law in
Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
1982]
722 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22
B. United States Legislative Proposals to Deal with
Concentration
Several proposals presently before Congress are designed
to deal more explicitly with the problem of concentration.
Each proposal would impose an absolute size limitation on
growth. The Kennedy Bill reintroduced in the House of Rep-
resentatives appears to be the most popular. It has three ma-
jor features.2 The first is a ban on growth through merger by
62. H.R. 4409, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (the bill was first introduced by Sen-
ator Kennedy as S. 600, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)). As reintroduced, the bill reads
as follows:
Be it enacted -by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be
cited as the "Small and Independent Business Protection Act of 1979."
Sec. 2 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall
merge or consolidate with any other person engaged in commerce, or
acquire, directly or indirectly, such amount of the stock or other share
capital of such other person as to enable such person to control such
other person, or acquire, directly or indirectly, a majority of the assets of
such other person, if-
(a) each person has assets or sales exceeding $2,000,000,000;
(b) each person has assets or sales exceeding $350,000,000; or
(c) one person has assets or sales exceeding $350,000,000 and the other
person has 20 per centum or more of the sales during the calendar year
immediately preceding the acqusition in any significant market.
Sec. 3. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), it shall be an af-
firmative defense to an offense under sections 2(b) and 2(c) that-
(1) the transaction will have the preponderant effect of substan-
tially enhancing competition;
(2) the transaction will result in substantial efficiencies; or
(3) within one year before or after the consummation of the transaction,
the parties thereto shall have divested one or more viable business units,
the assets and revenues of which are equal to or greater than the assets
and revenues of the smaller party to the transaction.
(b) Such affirmative defense shall not be available if one of the parties
to the transaction has within one year previous to the transaction been a
party to a prior transaction coming within the provisions of section 2(b)
or 2(c).
Sec. 4. (a) Authority to enforce compliance with section 2 is vested
in the Attorney General of the United States and the Federal Trade
Commission.
(b) The Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission shall
adopt procedures by which parties to a transaction within the terms of
section 2(b) and 2(c) can ascertain the determination of the Attorney
General or the Federal Trade Commission as to whether or not the
transaction is within the terms of any of the affirmative defenses set
forth in section 3. If the Attorney General or Commission, pursuant to
such procedures, advises a party that a transaction is within the terms
of any of the affirmative defenses set forth in section 3, the Attorney
General and the Federal Trade Commission shall be barred by such ad-
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corporations that have assets or annual sales of more than two
billion dollars and that wish to acquire firms of similar size. 3
The second feature is a ban on further growth by merger be-
tween corporations that have assets or annual sales of more
than 350 million dollars, unless the effect of the merger would
substantially enhance competition or provide substantial effi-
ciencies.6 4 Finally, firms with assets or annual sales exceeding
350 million dollars would be prohibited from acquiring a firm
having twenty percent or more of the sales of any significant
market, unless substantial enhancement of competition or
substantial efficiencies could be demonstrated.6  The Act fur-
ther directs the Attorney General and the Federal Trade
Commission to establish procedures by which to resolve
whether the defenses of "substantially enhancing competi-
tion" or "substantial efficiencies" apply." Private injunctive
relief is also provided for by the Act. 7
One provision merits further comment. The Act allows
firms with assets or sales exceeding 350 million dollars, or one
firm of that size and another with 20 percent of the significant
market, to escape the Act by divesting sufficient assets to
counterbalance the acquired assets. 8 However, this defense is
not allowed a company which has been party to a similar
transaction within one year. 9 If one were really interested in
vice in the absence of proof that the determination was based in whole
or substantial part on an intentional misstatement by the party request-
ing such advice.
Sec. 5. Injunctive relief for private parties may be granted under the
same terms and conditions as prescribed by section 16 of the Clayton
Act.
Sec. 6. (a) As used herein, "efficiencies" shall include economies of
scale in manufacturings, marketing, distribution, and research and
development.
(b) As used herein, "significant market" means any line of com-
merce in any section of the country which has annual sales of more than
$100,000,000.
Sec. 7. The provisions of this Act are in addition to and not in lieu
of other provisions of the antitrust law and nothing in this Act shall be
deemed to authorize or make lawful anything heretofore prohibited or
made illegal by other antitrust laws.
63. Id. § 2(a).
64. Id. §§ 2(b) and 3.
65. Id. §§ 2(c) and 3.
66. Id. § 4.
67. Id. § 5.
68. Id. § 3(a)(3).
69. Id. § 3(b).
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economic efficiencies, the defensive claim of efficiency would
not be limited by the number of transactions that have taken
place. In this respect, at least, it appears that the desire to
reduce the economic power of large firms is paramount.7 0 The
absolute prohibition on the merger of giant corporations
points in a similar direction.
C. Comparable Japanese Law
The Japanese Antimonopoly Act 7 '1 was passed in 1947
during the period of American occupation.7 2 Though there was
considerable Japanese opposition to the Act, particularly with
regard to a companion proposal for immediate forced decon-
centration, 3 the realities of occupation made that opposition
unimportant. The Diet adopted the Act under pressue from
the American occupation authorities.
As originally conceived, the purposes of both the An-
timonopoly and Deconcentration Laws were clearly political.
The allies viewed the Zaibatsu as not only having economic
power, but as also being the primary cause of Japanese milita-
rism. The dissolution of the Zaibatsu was seen as necessary to
the success of the occupation and the "democratization" of
Japan.7 '
As with most new laws, there was a period immediately
following the passage of the Antimonopoly Act where mean-
ingful enforcement was sought. Prosecution was, however, ini-
tiated by Americans, not the Japanese.7 Japanese authorities
continued to identify with the Zaibatsu and remained hostile
to the new law. The main reasons for this resistance to anti-
trust enforcement becomes clear when one contrasts Japanese
and American attitudes toward competition. As one commen-
tator has noted:
The American antitrust philosophy which had its roots in
Anglo-Saxon individualism was totally alien to the coop-
erative business philosophy of Japan, where competition
means intergroup rivalry for status and prestige. Outside
70. See supra note 61.
71. See supra note 3.
72. See generally E. HADLEY, ANTITRUST IN JAPAN (1970) [hereinafter cited as
HADLEY].
73. Id. at 107-24.
74. Id. at 3-19.
75. Id. at 147-65.
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the group, rivalry is fierce; inside it, cooperation rather
than competition is the guiding principle. Both the laissez
faire, perfectly competitive firm and the pure monopoly
are manifestations of Anglo-Saxon individualism; in both
cases the firm acts alone. Japan's social milieu is much
more hospitable to groupism; collusive rivalry among oli-
gopolies is the basic rule of behavior. Thus, the occupa-
tion-imposed Antimonopoly Law has never agreed fully
with its environment ever since it was enacted.7 6
The Japanese were eager to remove this peculiar Ameri-
can impediment to their economy as early as possible, yet def-
erence to their conquerors made complete rejection of anti-
trust unacceptable. In 1948, however, a sign that the allies had
altered their policy toward Japanese concentration7 brought
an immediate response from the Diet in the form of proposed
revisions. Amendments in 1949 removed the prohibition
against certain types of mergers and required only pre-mergdr
notification to the Fair Trade Commission, instead of pre-
merger permission from the FTC.7
The end of the occupation and the Peace Treaty of Sep-
tember 1951 provided the Japanese with their long sought op-
portunity to make more major revisions in the Antimonopoly
Act. These sweeping changes were enacted by the Amend-
ments of September 1, 1953 and brought the law "more in line
with the national tradition. '79
The provision proscribing disparities in bargaining
power was deleted. Resale maintenance was limitedly au-
thorized (copyrighted books, records and commodities
which are in daily use by the general consumer and easily
identifiable by trademarks and other labels, in free com-
petition with other similar commodities). The flat prohi-
bition on cartels was removed; instead, with the approval
of the FTC, two types of cartels were authorized, depres-
sion and rationalization. Restrictions on intercorporate
stockholding and interlocking multiple directorates were
further modified. The stipulation that these not be at-
tained by unfair methods of business was deleted, and the
76. K. HAITANI, THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC SYSTEM 131 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as HAITANI].
77. The sign was a publication by the Deconcentration Review Board known as
the "four points." HADLEY, supra note 72, at 168.
78. HADLEY, supra note 72 at 198.
79. HAITANI, supra note 76 at 132.
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only restriction remaining was that the result would not
be a substantial restraint of competition in any particular
field of trade. Reporting of intercorporate stock owner-
ship and interlocking directorates was required for com-
panies whose assets were valued at 100 million yen (about
$278,000). The Trade Association Law was repealed and
some of the prohibited acts were incorporated in a new
Article 8 in the Antimonopoly Law."0
Obviously, many of these changes would be unthinkable
within the United States.
In the period between 1953 and the mid-seventies, the en-
forcement of the Japanese antitrust laws was quite lax. Cases
were brought, but ordinarily they were resolved by consent.
By the mid-sixties, in fact, government policy promoted busi-
ness at the expense of domestic competition and protected
business against foreign encroachment. Export cartels were
approved and additional measures were adopted to limit for-
eign investment in Japanese companies.
The scenario which led to the dramatic reverse embodied
in the 1977 amendments began as a response to a pattern of
increasing economic concentration throughout the early sev-
enties."' Concern about this trend, particularly in the manu-
facturing sector of the economy, moved the Japanese FTC to
begin considering new antitrust proposals in late 1973.82 The
need for additional legislation was underscored by the inabil-
ity of then current law to block major mergers which signifi-
cantly increased concentration. 8
A contemporaneous development that added popular
support to antitrust was the increasing proliferation of price
fixing cartels in violation of the Antimonopoly Act.84 Under
the Act as it then existed, the FTC was limited to cancelling
acts it found in violation. No punitive, deterrent remedy ex-
isted. Consequently, firms which were caught in the act
merely continued the cartel price under the guise of indepen-
80. HADLEY, supra note 72 at 199-200.
81. See generally Ariga, Efforts to Revise the Japanese Antimonopoly Act, 21
ANTITRUST BULL. 703 (1976).
82. Id. at 703-05.
83. Former Commissioner Ariga identifies the failure of the FTC to block the
1970 merger between the Yawata and Fuji steel manufacturing companies as being
the regulatory failure which highlighted the impotence of former law. Id. at 704.
84. Id. at 705-06.
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dent action.88 The fact that much of this cartel activity was
centered in the oil industry, resulting in overescalating fuel
prices, caused the consumer outrage needed to spur the Diet
to act. Antitrust legislation was the response.
The 1977 amendments to the Japanese Antitrust Law
have several major features. The two principal ones put a
fixed size limit on non-financial institutions" and take mea-
sures against parallel pricing by the largest corporations .e
The amendments also create a new definition of a monopolis-
tic situation: a single company owning half of the share of the
relevant product market with the two largest companies own-
ing seventy-five percent of the market during a given year.88
In addition to market share, barriers to market entry must
exist and unnatural pricing patterns must exist. Examples of
such patterns include remarkably high prices, or a failure to
respond to market forces which would seem to require a de-
crease in price. 9 The Fair Trade Commission is given power
to require firms that discontinue unlawful acts to publicize
the fact that they have discontinued them. 0 Surcharges are
established for unreasonable restraints of trade in interna-
tional transactions,91 and a three-year statute of limitations
applies.2 The FTC is also empowered to restore competition
to industries with monopolistic situations but is prohibited
from destroying substantial scale efficiencies." Financial com-
pany holdings in non-financial companies are limited to five
percent,' although ten percent was permitted under prior
law.
The size limitation provisions essentially provide that any
company which has capitalization of a hundred billion yen
(roughly $44.5 million) or larger, or, alternatively, has annual
net assets of thirty billion yen (roughly $14.8 million) is gener-
85. Id.
86. Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Methods of Preserv-
ing Fair Trade, Act No. 54 of Apr. 14, 1947, art. 9-2 (as amended on June 3, 1977).
See infra appendix.
87. Id. Art. 18-2.
88. Id. Art. 2-7 (i).
89. Id. Art. 2-7 (iii) (b).
90. Id. Art. 6.
91. Id. Art. 7-2 (1).
92. Id. Art. 7-2 (5).
93. Id. Art. 8-4.
94. Id. Art. 11.
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ally prohibited from further growth." A number of exemp-
tions, of course, apply. Exemption may be granted by execu-
tive order." Developing industries are exempted where the
cabinet concludes that extra capitalization is required.9 7
Transactions involving foreign business loans to foreign gov-
ernments incidental to them are exempted. 8 Joint business
investments with foreign governments are exempted." Stocks
obtained through dividend or stockholder allocations are ex-
empted for two years, as is stock obtained as a result of the
exercise of a property interest (such a lien).'00 Finally, an ex-
emption may be granted for "urgent and imperative circum-
stances" subject to approval by the Fair Trade Commission.' 1
The parallel pricing provisions relate to industries in
which the total sales of goods or services in a given year ex-
ceed thirty billion yen.'0 2 If, under those circumstances, seven-
tenths of the volume is accounted for by the top three sellers,
and two or more (each with at least five percent of total sales)
make parallel price changes within the three month period,
the Fair Trade Commission may ask the sellers to furnish a
statement of reasons for their conduct.'03 It seems likely that
this provision has more meaning in a Japanese context than it
might have in the United States given the Japanese tradition
of respect for their government. In Japan, the obligation to
report to the Fair Trade Commission is probably a substantial
deterrent.
This brief summary of Japanese law is, of course, only
that. An appendix to this article provides parallel copies of
the Antitrust Law of 1947, with the amendments of 1953, and
1977, contrasted. Reference to these provisions will further
amplify the discussion.
D. U.S. Law Respecting Oligopoly Power
The concern respecting concentration focuses on single
95. Id. Art. 9-2.
96. Id. Art. 9-2 (1).
97. Id. Art. 9-2 (2).
98. Id. Art. 9-2 (3).
99. Id. Art. 9-2 (6).
100. Id. Art. 9-2 (8).
101. Id. Art. 9-2 (9).




firm size, both absolutely and in relation to competition in the
same market. Oligopolies, on the other hand, present
problems because of the aggregate size of its members. Quite
aside from the concern that members of oligopolies will grow
to become monopolists, United States courts express a con-
cern that oligopolies will jointly accomplish monopoly pric-
ing. 104 Monopoly pricing occurs when an industry is reduced
to a small number of firms and each, recognizing the advan-
tage of withholding supply and enhancing price, follows the
output and price leadership of other firms in the field. The
dilemma presented by such conduct is fairly technical. 105 The
antitrust laws prohibit monopolies; historically a single firm
exercised power and restraints of trade. Restraints of trade re-
quire duality. 08 Thus, so long as the firms remain careful to
avoid contact with each other in price setting,107 and so long
as each of them does not achieve monopoly power (held at the
moment to arise at probably no less than seventy-five percent
of market control),' ° they are innocent. 0 9 Hypothetically, at
least four firms, each with twenty-five percent of the market,
could each behave as a monopolist by following or initiating
price leadership. They would nevertheless be immunized from
both section 1 and 2 prosecution. How much price leadership
exists is disputed; the empirical studies are in disarray." 0 The
104. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir.
1978); Gainesville Util. v. Florida Power & Light, 573 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1978). Com-
mentators have also engaged in a lively debate over the treatment of oligopolies by
the antitrust laws. Compare Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sher-
man Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962)
with Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 1562 (1969) and Markovits' four-part article, Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, the
Sherman Act, and Economic Welfare, Part I, Oligopolistic Price and Oligopolistic
Pricing: Their Conventional and Operational Definition, 26 STAN. L. REV. 493
(1974); Part II, Injurious Oligopolistic Pricing Sequences: Their Description, Inter-
pretation, and Legality Under the Sherman Act, 26 STAN. L. REV. 717 (1974); Part
III, Proving (Illegal) Oligopolistic Pricing: A Description of the Necessary Evidence
and a Critique of the Received Wisdom About Its Character and Cost, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 307 (1975); Part IV, The Allocative Efficiency and Overall Desirability of Oligo-
polistic Pricing Suits, 28 STAN. L. REV. 45 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Markovits'
series].
105. The Markovits' series, supra note 104, establishes this beyond little doubt.
106. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537
(1954).
107. Id. at 551.
108. See supra note 12.
109. Theatre Enterprise, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537.
110. Markovits' series, supra note 104.
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law, on the other hand, professes to be clear cut, the Court
having held: "'Conscious parallelism' has not yet read con-
spiracy out of the ... Sherman Act ... "'"
Since this pronouncement, it has not been contended that
section 1 restraints of trade can be established simply by a
pattern of conscious parallelism.
Although many cases illustrate the viability of section 1
complaints against an apparent conscious instance of parallel-
ism, four cases illustrate the principal theories. In Sugar In-
stitute, Inc. v. United States,'1 2 the government successfully
prosecuted members of the trade association which had suc-
ceeded in maintaining uniform prices for sugar through a se-
ries of price fluctuations. The mechanism used by the group
required each member to announce a new price to be charged
in advance of adopting it."' Others were free, though at least
not formally required, to adopt the price."1 4 They invariably
adopted it."' While it is certainly possible that price uniform-
ity under these circumstances was accidental, sugar after all
being a fungible product incapable of supporting substantially
different prices, the mechanism adopted was designed to ac-
complish price uniformity. Further, the alternate explanations
for the adoption of this price announcement device seemed
remote. A trier of fact looking at the arrangement would prob-
ably conclude that it included a silent provision requiring
price adherence.
In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States,"6 the United
States Supreme Court held motion picture distributors to be
guilty of restraint of trade when they agreed with two large
exhibitors, Interstate and Consolidated, to adopt a series of
requirements concerning the pricing of motion pictures,
double features, and prohibitions and clearance periods be-
tween picture runs. 17 At that time, vertically imposed restric-
tions were generally held unilateral and therefore immune
from section 1.18 Nonetheless, the Court found an agreement
111. Theatre Enterprise Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537,
541.
112. 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
113. Id. at 579.
114. Id. at 580.
115. Id. at 582.
116. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
117. Id. at 214-29.
118. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
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among the distributors to comply with demands of the exhibi-
tors.119 The exhibitors had the power to exert economic pres-
sure on the distributors because they had an almost complete
monopoly on first run theaters in six Texas cities. While In-
terstate made demands on the distributors independently,
each distributor ultimately agreed to identical terms. The
Court approved, inferring conspiracy and noting that,
it taxes credulity to believe that the several distributors
would ... have accepted and put into operation with
substantial unanimity such far-reaching changes in their
business methods without some understanding that all
were to join, and we reject as beyond the range of
probability that it was a result of mere chance.1"'
Further, the Court listed specifics of the arrangements which
made duality even clearer:
The nature of the proposals made on behalf of Inter-
state and Consolidated; . . . the manner in which they
were made; ... the substantial unanimity of action taken
upon them by the distributors; and . . . the fact that ap-
pellants did not call as witnesses any of the superior offi-
cials who negotiated the contracts with Interstate or any
official who, in the normal course of business, would have
had knowledge of the existence or non-existence of such
an agreement among the distributors.121
In American Tobacco Co. v. United States,'2 2 the Court
approved restraint of trade charges, as well as charges of mo-
nopolization and the attempt to monopolize, against the de-
fendant-the three largest tobacco producers. A number of in-
stances of price leadership was presented.' Among the most
noteworthy was the raising of the price of the defendants' cig-
arettes in the face of declining demand in the early years of
the Great Depression. 12 Also relevant was the precipitous
lowering of price by all three companies in the face of an in-
creased market share by less expensive cigarette brands. In
both instances the three companies acted in an identical man-
ner, although the government did not prove that there had
119. Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. 219.
120. Id. at 223.
121. Id. at 221.
122. 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
123. Id. at 801.
124. Id. at 804-07.
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been an agreement to do so. The Court analyzed that fact as
follows:
No formal agreement is necessary to constitute an unlaw-
ful conspiracy. Often crimes are a matter of inference de-
duced from the acts of the person accused and done in
pursuance of a criminal purpose. Where the conspiracy is
proved, as here, from the evidence of the action taken in
concert by the parties to it, it is all the more convincing
proof of an intent to exercise the power of exclusion ac-
quired through that conspiracy. The essential combina-
tion or conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act may be
found in a course of dealing or other circumstances as
well as in an exchange of words. "
The facts were so unusual, given the pressures of the
time, that the court concluded the trier of fact was justified in
finding concerted action rather than mere passive following of
price setting. They were able to keep a relatively uniform level
of profits by further reducing their output in the face of the
Great Depression. That would seem to require a degree of
self-discipline difficult to believe. Thus, when the trier of fact
found that a conspiracy underlay the price uniformity, such a
conclusion seemed plausible.
In United States v. Container Corp. of America,126 the
Court confronted an instance of open exchange of pricing and
the apparent total absence of any agreement as to price main-
tenance. Members of the industry would sell corrugated
boxes, which were allegedly fungible goods incapable of com-
peting by non-price considerations. Members agreed to pro-
vide price information to each other upon request." 7 The gov-
ernment proved that prices had often been exchanged but did
not attempt to prove any instances of an agreement on the
price to be charged.12 8 Prices were, in the main, uniform. 29
That fact is, by itself, not surprising since the fungibility of
the boxes would make it difficult to resist the lower price es-
tablished by a competitor. The Court upheld a finding of a
section 1 violation after expressing concern that it not be read
to condemn obtaining price information as a restraint of
125. Id. at 809-10.
126. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
127. Id. at 335.
128. Id. at 334-35.
129. Id. at 336-37.
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trade.13 It recognized that it is generally essential to competi-
tion that those sharing a market have full information about
it.' Nonetheless, under the peculiar facts of the case, the
court concluded that the exchange of information was tanta-
mount to an agreement to maintain price.3 2
The language of the decision is extremely unsatisfying.
One would expect it to apply to totally competitive markets
which simply had become efficient in exchanging information
about prices. Furthermore, since offering price information to
each other appeared important to the result, the decision
seems easy to avoid by the simple expedient of price shopping
by each of the competitors. There would appear little warrant
in antitrust law for requiring the additional expense of such
shopping since the result would be the same as when prices
were exchanged among members. The Court did not accept
the government's theory that agreement could be demon-
strated by market structure. Yet, the government's case ulti-
mately redeems the Court's decision. Throughout the period
of price information exchange, there was slack capacity in the
manufacture of corrugated boxes. Yet throughout the period,
an increasing number of firms were attracted into the indus-
try. It is difficult to understand how an industry which has
slack capacity while behaving competitively would be continu-
ously inviting to newcomers. It is, on the other hand, easy to
understand how an industry with monopoly pricing might in-
vite others to share the benefit of the monopoly, even though
they ran the danger of the slack capacity. At least if the new-
comers were themselves willing to be modest in their claim of
a market share, it may well have been in the interest of the
extant members to share their pricing structure rather than to
compete with the newcomers. Viewed in that perspective, it
seems acceptable for a trier of fact to find an agreement un-
derlying the exchange of information because of the improba-
bility of any other hypothesis.
None of these cases, nor the other cases dealing with con-
scious parallelism, exclusively concerned oligopoly pricing. In
each of them, some additional feature made it possible to in-
fer the existence of an arrangement facilitating the pricing. In
130. Id. at 338-40 (Fortas, J., concurring).
131. Id.
132. The Court concluded, "Price is too critical, too sensitive a control to allow
it to be used even in an informal manner to restrain competition." Id. at 338.
1982l
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
economic theory, and probably in practice, it is possible to
achieve the same result with no artifice. In such instances, the
Paramount Theater holding would appear to bar prosecution.
Yet such pricing would still constitute undesirable market
manipulation. Both proposed American and extant Japanese
antitrust law had adopted new provisions designed to cope
with the problem.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE CONSCIOUS PARALLELISM
PROBLEM
Both the United States proposals and Japanese law pro-
hibit growth beyond a certain monetary size.1 33 In so doing,
they presumably militate against concentration at least in
those markets requiring heavy capital investment. Thus, by
keeping industry from growing more concentrated, they also
keep it from becoming oligopolistic and from using oligopoly
pricing strategies. It is, of course, quite possible that smaller
industries may be sufficiently concentrated to allow conscious
parallelism without exceeding the statutory maximum. Fur-
thermore, the acts are not aimed directly at conscious paral-
lelism but are aimed at all of the abuses believed to run with
aggregation of wealth. Anticoncentration law alone, therefore,
is not well designed to deal with oligopoly pricing.
In both Japan and the United States, those entrusted
with enforcing antitrust laws have attempted to solve the
problems relating to oligopoly pricing more specifically. In Ja-
pan, the solution was legislative. A procedure to confront
oligopolists was written into the 1977 amendments. In the
United States, the Antitrust Division and the FTC have sug-
gested ways of dealing with the problem within the framework
of existing statutory law.
The 1977 Japanese Amendments provide an administra-
tive procedure for requiring reports from companies found to
be charging identical prices consistently."3 The companies
presumably have the burden of explaining how those prices
were determined. In a country heavily influenced by govern-
ment "advice" in a manner which has no Western parallel,
such a reporting provision must be seen as having effect. It
would be a clear misconception to equate governmental par-
133. See supra text accompanying notes 62-70 and 86-101.
134. See supra notes 102-03.
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ticipation in such reporting functions with American presi-
dential jawboning or economic guidelines.
In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission and,
somewhat later, the Department of Justice have experimented
with the doctrine of shared monopoly. By use of that doctrine,
the government claimed that it was possible to avoid the need
to demonstrate conspiracy, holding those who act in identical
ways (albeit by unilateral imitation) to be responsible for the
monopoly power they share. The cases brought to date do not
suggest a clear pattern. One set of defendants, the cereal man-
ufacturers, are large firms in a large industry.1 3 5 Others have
been smaller. Also, it has been difficult to tell under what cir-
cumstances the government would conclude that uniform
prices are the product of price imitation rather than of effec-
tive competition since both would lead to pricing uniformity
over time. The courts have so far rejected the shared monop-
oly theory and it may be abandoned. If still asserted, it would
surely require selective application. It would be one thing, for
example, to apply a shared monopoly theory in Continental
Can as an alternative to finding section 1 duality. Without
some basis for inferring a recognized common purpose, the
doctrine could bar competitive prices charged in a concen-
trated small industry. The latter would appear to serve no
purpose.
A. The Role of the Executive Branch in Selection of Con-
centration Cases
Except for the monetary limitations on aggregate size
provision, a great deal of discretion is left in the Executive
Branch as to the enforcement of the provisions discussed. 1 3
Selective enforcement is the rule. 37 The courts relinquished
135. The FTC has recently dropped its shared monopoly theory in the cereals
cases. See In re Kellogg Co., No. 8883, FTC, (Jan. 15, 1982). An illuminating memo-
randum reflective of the Carter Administration Antitrust Division's attitude toward
the shared monopoly problem appears in 874 Antitrust and Trade Reg. Rep. (1978).
136. The FTC, although technically an "independent" regulatory agency, is
generally considered to be under relatively great executive control. The Antitrust Di-
vision, of course, is under direct executive control. While it remains unclear for the
moment how the FTC will affect enforcement of the new Japanese law, many of its
provisions seem to invite substantial executive intervention.
137. Cases of the magnitude needed to significantly affect the nation's overall
level of concentration cannot ordinarily be prosecuted by private actions because
their length and expense are prohibitive.
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supervisory control of section 7 merger cases at least until the
mid-seventies.18 Exclusive dealing and tying cases reflect sim-
ilar executive choice. Monopolization cases are no
exception.139
Unfortunately, optimism about executive wisdom is likely
naive. While one might entrust the selection of antitrust de-
fendants to a truly independent administrative agency sworn
to impartiality without concern, the same process can easily
be abused when put in the hands of political partisans in the
Executive Branch. This by no means suggests that politicians
would be corrupt in their administration. The whole criminal
justice system depends on a contrary assumption. Nonethe-
less, where there is great selectivity required and where the
law is necessarily vague, considerations of the political conse-
quences of one suit as opposed to another must surely seem a
reasonable consideration to those who frequently must return
for a popular mandate at the polls. Whether or not such con-
siderations are inevitable, they at least have occurred.14 0 For
138. It appears that the present Supreme Court is reviewing § 7 cases with a
vigor unknown at the time of Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. 270. See Lurie, Mergers Under
the Burger Court: An Antitrust Bias and Its Implications, 23 VILL. L. REV. 213
(1978).
139. E.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
140. President Nixon, for example, personally ordered the Department of Jus-
tice to forego an appeal of an unfavorable verdict in a major action against IT&T.
The transcript of the meeting in which the order was given provides an interesting
example of how political motivations affect antitrust policy. In reading the following
discussion, compare Mr. Shultz' rationale with the president's.
Shultz: If you look at concentration ratios over a period of time, on hori-
zontal integration, if you look at ratios of sales to value added on verti-
cal integration, what you find is no evidence of any increase in, in mo-
nopoly in American business. In fact, over a thirty-year period, and I
checked this over with my friend, Stigler, who has made a lot of these
studies. If anything, you see a decline. And in the conglomerate area is
what I think we are witnessing, is, uh, a sort of a reaction to the buildup
of conglomerates, which is perhaps affected somewhat by the antitrust.
But basically, the market place is taken care of, in a sense that a lot of
the firms that acquired businesses that they really didn't know anything
about, are finding that they can't run those businesses very well and
they are getting rid of them. And, uh, so there is a cleansing process
taking place. And where you have, uh, where you have a [unintelligible]
of conglomerates, I believe, the case can be made, uh, rather readily in,
uh, many, many instances, that they add to the sharpness of competi-
tion, because they acquire a relatively small firm, they give it muscle
and they send it into, into competition and make the market work bet-
ter. At least this is the, this is the general posture that I'm taking in
this, uh, talk. I believe that the evidence-I don't-I mean I don't-I'm
not a lawyer and I don't know all of that side of it.
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that reason, legislation removing discretion, such as the abso-
Ehrlichman: You're not the only one.
Shultz: From the standpoint of the economics of it, uh, I would be the
last to say we should not continue, uh, to, uh, pursue the antitrust laws
in the proper way, but, the, uh-I think the conglomerates have taken a
bum rap.
President: This is, this is the problem. The problem is McLaren's a nice
little fellow who's a good little antitrust lawyer out in Chicago. Now he
comes in and all these bright little bastards that worked for the Anti-
trust Department for years and years and years and who hate business
with a passion-any business-have taken him over. They haven't taken
him over. Then of course McLaren is the man. They to
into-Kleindienst is busy appointing judges; Mitchell is busy doing
other things so they're afraid to overrule him. By God they're not going
to do it. I mean the point is that on this antitrust they had deliberately
gone into a number of areas which have no relationship with each other,
to-whether it's a question of operating more, efficiently than the rest.
There's simply a question of tactically, they've gone off on a kick, that'll
make them big God damn trust busters. That was all right fifty years
ago. Fifty years ago maybe it was a good thing for the country. It's not a
good thing for the country today. That's my views about it, and I am
not-We've been, through this crap. They've done several of them al-
ready about-They have raised holy hell with the people that we, uh,
uh-Well, Geneen, hell, he's no contributor. He's nothing to us. I don't
care about him. So you can-I've only met him once, twice-uh, we've,
I'm just, uh-I can't understand what the trouble is.
Ehrlichman: Well,
President: It's McLaren, isn't it?
Ehrlichman: McLaren has a very strong sense of mission here.
President: Good-Jesus, he's-Get him out. In one hour,
Ehrlichman: He's got a
President: One hour.
Ehrlichman: Very strong-
President: And he's not going to be a judge, either. He is out of the God
damn government. You know, just like that regional office man in, in, in
San Francisco. I put an order into Haldeman today that he be fired
today.
Ehrlichman: Yeah.
Transcript of meeting between Richard M. Nixon, John D. Ehrlichman and George P.
Shulz at the White House (Apr. 19, 1971).
It is not surprising to find Mr. Schultz viewing conglomerate mergers from an
economic perspective since economics is his discipline. Equally obviously, President
Nixon viewed the matter from his political perspective. The President is, of course,
the final arbiter. One should generally expect that vague provisions of Antitrust Law
will ultimately be interpreted in keeping with the political persuasion of the current
Chief Executive. This comment is not designed to suggest corruption. It is meant
instead to suggest the inevitable price of leaving such broad discretion about the
structure of the business community to the enforcement policy of the Executive
Branch. No documents exist to compare the actions of other Presidents with Richard
Nixon's. If their style might have been more ingratiating than Mr. Nixon's, the thrust
of their decisions could not have differed greatly. The President is expected to make
decisions that will favorably reflect on his political party. If he may not favor individ-
ual friends and harm individual enemies, at least he can determine policy with re-
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lute size limitation legislation, may seem preferable to legisla-
tion leaving broad prosecutorial discretion to deal with the
political question of concentration.
B. Prospects for the Changes
Given the prognosis for the immediate future, the United
States' concern with economic concentration may wane. De-
spite the zeal of several proponents in Congress, United
States' economic interests, both at home and abroad, are suf-
fering from more aggressive foreign competition than at any
time since World War II. It may no longer be as important to
many that large business aggregations in the United States be
broken up as it is that they become more aggressively compet-
itive with foreign made products. Thus, for example, the auto-
mobile oligopoly may seem acceptable so long as it develops
lighter and more efficient cars to compete with the Japanese
and European imports that have gained so large a share of the
American market. Similarly, many would presumably wish to
halt the shift of electronics from the United States to Asia,
even if it meant a rebirth of the large electrical firms once so
powerful in the United States. The current United States Su-
preme Court, a Court shaped by Republican presidents, 4' has
taken a more conservative attitude toward antitrust than the
Warren Court before it.142 Also, strong forces exist in Ameri-
can public life to moderate the campaign toward reduced con-
centration and to interpret extant antitrust law less expan-
sively. Most notably, the Attorney General and the Assistant
Attorney General for Antitrust have pursued dramatically
limited policies of enforcement. The Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral has, in fact, announced his intention to participate in
spect to levels of enforcement criteria for case selection, extent of appeal and the like.
Possibly he can legitimately determine which companies to prosecute and which to
leave alone, absent a corrupt direct agreement between him and the affected firms in
making any of those decisions, if no coherent economic theory of Antitrust exists. The
President would likely exercise his discretion as he does with respect to other execu-
tive policy matters; he would make a political decision.
141. President Richard M. Nixon appointed Chief Justice Burger and Associate
Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist. President Gerald R. Ford appointed As-
sociate Justice John Paul Stevens. President Ronald Reagan appointed Associate Jus-
tice Sandra Day O'Connor.
142. See Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1974, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
243 (1975); Lurie, Mergers Under the Burger Court: An Antitrust Bias and its Impli-
cations, 23 VILL. L. REV. 213 (1978).
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cases brought by private litigants that threaten to stretch An-
titrust Law beyond the confines he believes appropriate. In
the process, the Justice Department has expressly rejected
case precedent outlawing vertical relationships (unless they
have direct horizontal effect even when they are currently per
se offenses). Departmental policies have come under attack
for members of Congress, but, at this writing, they seem se-
cure. Furthermore, a substantial economic downturn, a move
toward decreasing government regulation, and decreasing
levels of taxation14 3 make aggressive anti-big-business cam-
paigns appear difficult. Similar concerns apply to Japan's eco-
nomic situation. While Japan appears to be healthier econom-
ically than the United States, substantial segments of
Japanese industry are more dependent on foreign markets
than is the United States which can rely on its domestic mar-
ket to support much of its industry. Ultimately, Japan may
not be able to limit domestic concentration if world competi-
tion requires a larger scale.
143. The current proposals to limit FTC rulemaking authority and California's
Proposition 13 are just two instances of this trend.
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